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For many of the ancient Greek philosophers, the ethical life was understood to be closely 
tied up with important notions like rational integrity, self-control, self-sufficiency, and so 
on. Because of this, feeling or passion (pathos), and in particular, pleasure, was viewed 
with suspicion. There was a general insistence on drawing up a sharp contrast between a 
life of virtue on the one hand and one of pleasure on the other. While virtue was regarded 
as rational and as integral to advancing one’s well-being or happiness and safeguarding 
one’s autonomy, pleasure was viewed as largely irrational and as something that usually 
undermines a life of reason, self-control and self-sufficiency. I want to try to show that 
the hedonist Aristippus of Cyrene, a student and contemporary of Socrates, was unique in 
not drawing up such a sharp contrast. Aristippus, I argue, might be seen to be challenging 
the conception of passion and pleasure connected to loss of self-control and hubristic 
behavior. Not only do I try to show that pleasure according to Aristippus is much more 
comprehensive or inclusive than it is usually taken to be, but that a certain kind of control 
and self-possession actually play an important part in his conception of pleasure and in 
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Aristippus is traditionally understood as a sybaritic hedonist, someone who only cares for 
physical pleasures at the expense of any concern for such ethical notions, like self-control 
and rational integrity. But this traditional interpretation, I will argue, is simply not 
correct. Rather, Aristippus, I claim, might be seen to be challenging the conception of 
passion and pleasure connected to loss of self-control and hubristic behavior. Not only do 
I try to show that pleasure according to Aristippus is much more comprehensive or 
inclusive than it is usually taken to be, but that a certain kind of control and self-
possession play an important part in his conception of pleasure and in his hedonism as a 
whole.   
I proceed in roughly four stages. First, I argue against that aspect of traditional 
interpretation which has Aristippus tagged as someone upholding exclusively a sybaritic 
view of pleasure. I contend that a careful reading of the testimony reveals no such 
exclusivity on his part. Second, I take a closer look at Aristippus’ intellectual context and 
influences with respect to the notion of pleasure. This supplies us with further reason, I 
argue, to suppose that Aristippus would not have construed pleasure so narrowly. Third, I 
attempt to uncover a more positive account of Aristippus’ notion of pleasure. And finally, 
I speculate on the ethical significance of pleasure according to Aristippus.   
 
– 1 – 
 
 Aristippus is viewed, both by ancient and modern commentators, as holding a 
sybaritic view of pleasure, that is to say, one concerned exclusively with the more 
immediate or short-term bodily pleasures, usually associated with appetites for sex, food 
and drink. For instance, Cicero attributes to him, in polemical fashion, the view that 
pleasure is “an agreeable and delightful excitation of the sense, which is what even dumb 
cattle, if they could speak, would call pleasure” (De fin. II 18); and later in the same work 
he says that Aristippus held that we are here “like some dull, half-witted sheep, in order 
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to feed and enjoy the pleasure of procreation” (II 40).1 Lucian dubs him the ‘sophist of 
pleasant sensations’, and it is clear he has primarily bodily pleasure in mind since his 
(Aristippus’) drunken condition prohibits him from actually speaking in Lucian’s sketch 
(Vit. auct. 12). A modern example is Guthrie, who claims that Aristippus “was a hedonist 
in the vulgar sense of indulging excessively in food, drink and sex…” and that his 
“hedonism was of the strictest sort. Pleasure was confined to bodily pleasure” (1971, 143, 
174). And the list is not insubstantial that goes on in this vein.2  
Let me first begin with this often made claim about sybariticism. Is there really 
strong evidence for this view of Aristippus? The answer here must be, not especially, or 
at least, not exclusively so. I start with three preliminary but important points which must 
be considered.  
First, though one must not neglect Aristippus’ more profligate tendencies, since 
they are indisputably there, as, among others, the reports of both Xenophon3 and 
Athenaeus4 clearly point out, such reports should be taken with a large grain of salt. This 
is because the ‘voluptuous and pleasure-loving’5 position of Aristippus no doubt inspired 
much contempt from contemporaries and various later thinkers (for instance, according to 
Diogenes Laertius, Xenophon, Theodorus and Plato are all said to have abused Aristippus 
because of his position on pleasure –II 65). And such contempt most likely expressed 
itself in exaggerated and scandalizing stories about Aristippus, where these stories were 
then in turn used to provide one-sided illustrations of his position on pleasure. That 
hedonists, even those of the most subtle and sophisticated variety, often get tarred with 
 
1 Earlier, in Book I, Cicero states clearly that it is physical enjoyment (corpore voluptatem) 
Aristippus is after (23).  
2 To mention but a few: Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 40; Rankin, 1983, 200; Kahn, 1996, 18.  
3 Xenophon reports that Socrates is aware that Aristippus is intemperate regarding “eating and 
drinking and sexual indulgence” (Mem. 2. 1. 1).      
4 Athenaeus claims that Aristippus “…lived amid every form of luxury and expensive indulgence 
in perfumes, clothes and women.” (Deip. XII 544b) 
5 Quoted from Aristocles, apud Eusebius, Prep. Evang. XIV. 18. 31. 
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the brush of excess and sensualism, is, after all, not all that surprising. We need only be 
reminded of Epicurus who was slandered by his contemporaries (DL 10 4-8).  
Second, we should see, in part, some of Aristippus’ apparent levity and crudity as 
representing a Socratic trait, namely, his playfulness and ironical mode of presentation. 
Like Socrates, Aristippus, through his own brand of shock tactics and witticisms, wanted 
to rouse those who hear him to thought.6 Thus we ought not always take all the 
scandalizing and profligate things Aristippus says or does as entirely and accurately 
representing the underlying view or theory on his part.  
But third, and perhaps most importantly, the sybaritic interpretation rides partly 
on a confusion wrought up over the synonymy between the two Aristippi, the former and 
his grandson of the same name (I return to this shortly). Moreover, many of the 
attributions in the sources seem to be pointing to a view of the Cyrenaics in general, 
failing in distinguishing between Aristippus himself and later modifications of his 
followers. And why is this important? Because if we look closely at the testimony we see 
that it is largely the Cyrenaics, and not Aristippus, who exalt bodily pleasures and who 
take it to occupy a central place in their ethics.7 For instance, in Diogenes’ first 
doxographical section comprising the life of Aristippus (which he marks off from the rest 
of the Cyrenaics), there is no indication that bodily pleasures are viewed as paramount. 
To be sure, there are references to luxurious living but there are just as many, if not more, 
references to philosophical, intellectual, and artistic pleasures –the sorts of enjoyments 
hard to square with a purely sybaritic or sensationalistic conception of pleasure. This 
general mix of enjoyments stands in somewhat stark contrast to the following section on 
his successors, the Cyrenaics, where numerous explicit references are made to bodily 
 
6 See Rankin, 1983, 199.  
7 For example, DL II 87; Cicero, Luc. 139; Lactantius, Divin. Inst. 28. 3, 34-7.  
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pleasure as the best kind and as occupying the final end8 with comparatively little 
mention (and if so, in a lower status) in the way of mental pleasures.9   
That said, there is one passage in particular which is often referred to as evidence 
of a simple physicalist or bodily view of pleasure in Aristippus. Diogenes reports that 
Aristippus “defined the telos as the smooth movement (th_n lei/an ki/nhsin) that comes 
forth to perception” (II 85). Now we should be wary here in attributing such a claim to 
Aristippus. Aristocles of Messene reports that Aristippus affirmed that the essence of 
happiness lay in pleasures, without specification as to what sort, while his grandson, 
Aristippus Junior, went on to clearly define these pleasures as movements or kinetic 
(Eusebius, Praep. Ev. XIV. 18. 31).10 Moreover this description at II 85 seems to be best 
understood as one backed by a kind of radical epistemology –a view which we can 
almost certainly claim had not been developed by Aristippus.11 This, and the fact that 
there are very few non-conflated references elsewhere to kinetic pleasures in Aristippus 
(the elder), seems to suggest Diogenes has confused the evidence here.  
In any case, setting aside likely issues of conflation between Aristippus and his 
grandson, the assumption here is that because Aristippus characterizes pleasure as 
involving some sort of physical movement that it must therefore be the bodily kind which 
he has primarily in mind. But strictly considered, this account, i.e. that all pleasure 
experiences or perceptions are influenced by underlying physical movements, need not 
entail such an assumption. That is, the fact that pleasure involves being affected by some 
kind of underlying movement in the body need not imply that the pleasure engaged in be 
of a direct bodily sort, like, for instance, settling into a hot bath or getting a massage. 
Consider, for instance, Plato’s Philebus (a composition of Aristippus’ time and available 
to him): Socrates, in giving what looks like a generic account of pleasures, speaks of 
 
8 For instance, DL II 87, 89, 90.  
9 Though there are perhaps a few exceptions, e.g. ibid, 89, 96.  
10 Notice also that Athenaeus entangles Aristippus ‘and his followers’ when he ascribes kinetic 
pleasure to them (Deip. XII, 546e).  
11 For more on this, see Urstad, 2008, Section I.  
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them as affections that “penetrate through both body and soul and provoke a kind of 
upheaval (seismon) that is peculiar to each but also common to both of them.” (33d, 
italics added) Whenever he speaks of the more pure pleasures (e.g. those of expectation 
that the soul experiences by itself without the body, 32c; those of pure colors, sounds, 
shapes and smells, 51b) he never once indicates that a complexion of pleasures of this 
sort requires a different account from the generic one. What looks to be implied here is 
that a kind of common movement, both in the body and soul, is something that underlies 
all experiences of pleasure.12 Aristippus, if indeed we are justified in attributing this 
passage in Diogenes to him, need perhaps be no different in this regard.   
Moreover, it is perhaps significant that Aristippus does not appear to adopt any 
version of the most dominant conception of pleasure in and around his time. What I am 
referring to here is the general restorative or replenishment view of pleasure, which 
seems to have its roots in Empedocles and is developed and discussed throughout many 
of Plato’s works (and is held by pleasure-pursuers like Callicles).13 This view defines 
pleasure as the replenishment of a lack or the relief from distress, it is the movement that 
consists in the restoration of an original harmony, the so-called ‘natural condition’.  
Such a view does not seem to cohere with the testimony on Aristippus in the 
following ways. To begin with, there is no indication, as far as I am aware, of a 
description of pleasure in Aristippus as taking a certain direction, e.g. towards repletion. 
Instead, what we do find, as just mentioned, is a description of pleasure as occurring in a 
certain manner or as adopting a certain texture (th_n lei/an ki/nhsin, DL II 85). 
Withholding the strong possibility of conflation, it is far from clear what exactly is meant 
by this description, but, it is significant, I think, that the motion spoken of here is a 
kinesis and not a genesis, since it is the latter, not the former, which has more obvious 
 
12 Epicurus too appears to think that there are kinetic mental pleasures (Plut. Col. 1122e, Non 
Posse, 1087b).   
13 See Gosling and Taylor, 1982 and Riel, 2000, for detailed examinations of this model. 
Gomperz, 1964, 215, too seems to suggest that Aristippus’ concept of pleasure should not be seen 
in this light.     
 
7 




                                                
affinities with the replenishment view. That is, pleasure as a process of coming-to-be, and 
therefore for the sake of something else, fits well with the view that pleasure is the 
process toward the natural condition, e.g. eating when hungry for sake of the restoration 
of the body.  
Moreover, it is interesting when this sort of genesis view, attributed to certain 
subtle thinkers, is discussed in the Philebus (53cff). It is interesting because Socrates says 
that anyone holding this view will obviously mock those who claim that pleasure is the 
good. But while the aim of the subtlers is to show that no pleasure is the good or the goal, 
Aristippus is, as we have seen, clearly reported as having held that pleasure is the good or 
the proper final object of pursuit. Thus that Aristippus would not fit well as a candidate 
for a holder of the view of the subtlers perhaps gives us further reason to suppose he is 
not working within this replenishment model. 
And finally, what is especially important to notice is that the replenishment view 
is mostly taken to be concerned with the more typical bodily pleasures, since it is 
obviously these sorts of pleasures which are best characterized as fulfillment of a lack, 
relief from pain, as is made clear from, among others, Plato.14 However, as we have seen, 
pleasures in Aristippus, though they no doubt include them, are not restricted to the 
bodily kind. He is, for example, said to have taken pleasure in conversation (DL II 79), 
fine clothes and scents (Athen. Deip. XII 544b). I mention the pleasures of conversing or 
learning since they seem quite disparate from some of the more restrictedly sybaritic ones 
like satisfying a desire for sex; however, as Plato argues for in the Republic (585bff), 
such pleasures can nevertheless be conceived of as pleasures of filling or replenishment. 
On the other hand, the latter example regarding the enjoyment of certain scents or 
perfumes is somewhat more intriguing. Both in the Republic (584b-c) and Philebus (51b) 
Plato looks to reserve a special place, seemingly somewhere outside of his usual 
replenishment analysis, for such partially aesthetic pleasures (along with those of hearing 
 
14 For example, “However, most of the so-called pleasures which reach the soul through the body, 








                                                
and sight). That is, he certainly does say that such pleasures are not preceded by any sort 
of distress, and even though there is some controversy among scholars here15, it is, at 
least prima facie, difficult to see them as belonging to the view that pleasure is the 
correcting of an imbalance or replenishment of a natural lack. This might be taken as 
further suggestive of the view that it is not the restorative model of pleasure Aristippus is 
promoting.    
 
– 2 – 
 
Adherents of the view that Aristippus adopts something like a bodily view of pleasure 
might appeal to Plato’s Protagoras. They might appeal to the Protagoras because the 
standard interpretation there seems to be that in that particular bit of the dialogue where 
pleasure is discussed Socrates has in mind something like a coarse empiricist view of 
pleasure, pleasure as a uniform sensation16; not only is phenomenological uniformity 
often seen in conjunction with bodily pleasure, but Socrates often mentions examples of 
physical pleasures there. Thus since Aristippus was almost certainly well acquainted with 
and influenced by this work17, it is also possible that he had picked up, or found 
corroboration in, the notion of pleasure there standardly taken to be expressed by 
Socrates.      
A major difficulty with such an appeal would be that it is not at all clear that 
Socrates in the Protagoras actually adopts the view that is standardly attributed to him. 
Actually, it is in itself significant that Socrates, in this work, does not really say that 
 
15 See, e.g., Gosling and Taylor, 1982, Chap. 6-8.   
16 For example, see Irwin, 1977, 111; Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 177, think it tempting to treat 
pleasure in the Protagoras ‘as a sensation like warmth’. This empiricist conception is commonly 
assumed because in the Protagoras it appears (to these interpreters) that the only differentiation 
made between kinds of pleasures is quantitative, the amount of pleasure achieved (356b), a 
criterion friendly to a conception of pleasure as a distinct and commensurable sensation state (see 
also Irwin, 1995, 90).      








                                                
much about what he supposes pleasure to be.18 It is true that he gives examples of 
pleasant things like food, drink and sex (353c) –examples which appear to conform to the 
standard view, but we ought to observe that he does so only within the context of his 
description of the akratic individual on behalf of the many. The labelling and 
employment of such pleasures here of course makes good protreptic sense, but it says 
little about Socrates’ conception of pleasure in that dialogue as a whole.  
There are however several clues throughout the dialogue which do fill out this 
conception somewhat. For instance, prior to that segment of the discussion concerning 
pleasure and the pleasant life (351b), Prodicus is made to distinguish between ‘to be 
pleased’ and ‘to be cheered’, and to associate bodily pleasures with the former and 
mental pleasures with the latter. Plato’s point here is not just to communicate mere 
pedantry on the part of Prodicus. What Plato is also doing, it might be suggested, is 
signalling to us that the ensuing discussion of pleasure is to be understood in its widest or 
most comprehensive sense.  
Moreover, later, at the near closing of the case for the denial of akrasia, Socrates 
says some things which ought to strike those who adhere to the standard view as peculiar. 
First, at 357b, Socrates says “what exactly this art, this knowledge is (of pleasures and 
pains) we can inquire into later”. We might wonder why, if pleasure was some simple 
uniform sensation, Socrates would think he has not yet exhausted just what this art of 
measurement is or consists in. That Socrates would withhold certainty with respect to this 
suggests he has a somewhat more open-ended conception of pleasure (and pain) than the 
standard interpretation calls for.  
And indeed, something like this seems to be given further validation when 
Socrates goes on to say to Prodicus “I beg indulgence of Prodicus who distinguishes 
among words; for whether you call it (the pleasant) ‘pleasant’ or ‘delightful’ or 
‘enjoyable’, whatever manner you please to name this sort of thing…” (358a-b, italics 
 
18 On recognition of the fact that Socrates there makes little attempt to define pleasure at all, that 
he never delves into its nature, see Riel, 2000, 9 and D. Frede, 1999, 349.  
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added). It is hard not to see such terms as connoting a very wide variety of positive 
psychological states. This surely indicates Socrates’ refusal to allow any narrowing of 
that wide range of meaning which the words accept. So that Socrates so readily exploits 
their conflation or synonymy again suggests that when he uses the word ‘pleasure’ or 
‘pleasant’ he has something broader in mind than the standard uniform sensation view (in 
fact, we ought to notice that Socrates has already used ‘enjoy’ as a synonym at 354c-d).  
We should also notice that the term hedone itself is used in many places in the 
Protagoras, and in a way both Socrates and the everyday person would use it, and in 
these cases the referent has nothing to do with physical or bodily pleasures. For instance, 
When Socrates and young Hippocrates arrive at the house of Callias, Socrates says of the 
pupils of Protagoras, that their “…dance simply delighted me (h(/sqhn i)dw/n) when I 
saw how beautifully they took care never to get in Protagoras’ way.” (315b); at 347b 
Socrates states: “I leave it up to Protagoras, but if it’s all right with him (h(/dion)…”; and 
following this he says to him: “I would be glad to settle (h(de/wj a)n e)pi\ te/loj e)/lqiomi) 
in a joint investigation with you.” (347c) All this is ordinary, everyday Greek usage of 
the term, and it clearly betrays a broad application.   
Thus there are two important distinctions to be made here, both implying open-
endedness. In the first case, Socrates is saying (to Prodicus) that terms like ‘enjoyment’, 
‘delight’, etc, words which connote a wide range of positive psychological states, can 
mean the same as, or be used interchangeably with, or subsumed under, the term hedone. 
In the second case, variations of hedone itself can be seen to be used in a variety of 
contexts where different sorts of pleasures are being implied.   
Furthermore, it may be significant that Socrates includes the ‘defence of one’s 
city’ as one of the compensating pleasures (for the prior undergoing of such painful 
things as military training and starvation diets) mentioned at 354b. The pleasure here 
seems to amount to something like the satisfaction of knowing that one’s efforts and 
deprivations have contributed to the city’s safety. Again, whatever sort of pleasure this is 
exactly, it is not done full justice by the standard view. Thus it seems most reasonable to 
understand the notion of pleasure in the Protagoras as a largely inclusive and 
 
11 




                                                
heterogeneous one, compatible with a wide field of experiences or psychological states, 
like positive sensations, attitudes, perceptions, or feelings.  
Finally, one might comment on Socrates’ opening question to Protagoras at the 
start of their discussion on pleasure: “Now, if he (the everyday man) completed his life, 
having lived pleasantly, does he not seem to you to have lived well?” (351b) On its own, 
the expression ‘the pleasant life’ is undeniably vague, and it seems this is precisely why 
Socrates employs it. This is corroborated by the expression he takes it to be synonymous 
with, ‘to live well’. No doubt in normal Greek parlance ‘to live well’ involves saying that 
one is leading a comfortable life, having one’s bodily needs met, in a word, that one is 
getting one’s basic bodily pleasures19; but it also standardly connotes the idea of a life of 
various sorts of satisfactions and enjoyments, moral ones, aesthetic ones, etc.                
In sum then, if Aristippus was exposed to, or influenced by, the Protagoras, it 
need not be an indication that he turned to, or found corroboration in, a bodily view of 
pleasure. In fact, given what has just been said, it is probably more likely that what would 
have resonated in him is a much more inclusive sense of the notion of pleasure.               
Another important piece of work during this time to take into consideration with 
respect to Aristippus and pleasure is Plato’s Philebus. In fact, for various reasons, many 
scholars have seen this dialogue in close connection with Aristippus.20 Part of what 
Socrates does there is that he illuminates and enlarges the coarse and vague application of 
the term ‘pleasure’ as it is used by the younger interlocutors in the early stages of the 
discussion. At the outset, Protarchus denies that good and bad pleasures are unlike each 
other in so far as they are pleasures or qua pleasures (13c5). He rejects Socrates’ view 
that the temperate and intemperate person are undergoing different pleasures (12c8-d4). 
According to Protarchus, pleasure is the same thing regardless of what occasions it or of 
what it points to, so that the temperate and intemperate are simply getting the same thing 
from different sources. This suggests he understands pleasure simply as some kind of 
 
19 On the closeness between ‘living well’ (and such similar expressions) and pleasure in Greek 
thought, see Stokes, 1986, 366.  
20 For instance, Merlan, 1960, 33-5; Zeller, 1963, 112; Irwin, 1995, 16. 
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sensation or feeling which is entirely distinct from the activity associated with it, a 
“kick…a mere aftereffect or epiphenomenon” as D. Frede (1993, xviii) has put it.  
Socrates’ disagreement with Protarchus is made clear right from the very 
beginning of their dialogue when he makes the preliminary claim that an examination of 
the nature (phusis) of pleasure reveals that it is a ‘complex’ thing and that ‘in fact it 
comes in many forms’ (12c). The gist of Socrates’ ensuing argument might be put as 
follows. He argues that ‘pleasure’ is not a name for a single intuited quality of feeling or 
unitary phenomenon at all, anymore than there is one concretely intuited quality of 
experience called ‘color’. Both are something like abstract class concepts. One does not 
directly experience pure pleasure as such (just as one does not experience pure color as 
such), rather, what one does experience are particular instances or species of pleasure (or 
instances of color –say, blue or green). The way particular instances of pleasure are to be 
identified and distinguished from one another is presumably by mentioning something 
about the causes, activities or qualities of experience with which they are associated.  
Whatever precisely Socrates may have in mind here, the general point seems 
obvious enough. Instances of pleasure are not to be identified purely by some feeling-
element over and above the pursuits enjoyed, something usually characteristic of bodily 
sensations, but rather, by certain non-affective properties such as perhaps their causes, 
intentional objects (35b), etc. Socrates is thus rejecting the possibility of completely 
separating pleasure from the activities or pursuits in the way that his interlocutor 
Protarchus seems to be doing (and which, it might be added, is more typical of modern 
hedonists like Bentham and Mill). 
Now, I am not proposing that Aristippus has in mind an account of pleasure like 
Socrates does in the Philebus.21 All I am suggesting is that the availability of this 
dialogue and Aristippus’ likely familiarity with it and other works like the Protagoras,22 
 
21 Of course Socrates in the Philebus is not extolling hedonism. Pleasure turns out to receive fifth 
position on the candidate list for the highest good (67a).  
22 We should notice that Plato, throughout his works, uses a variety of suggestive idioms in 
describing pleasure. For instance, at Gorgias 496e drinking is said to be a filling of a deficiency 
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at least makes it plausible to think that Aristippus was indeed aware of, and receptive to, 
the plasticity of the concept of pleasure, its multifarious nature –circumstances which we 
might reasonably suppose would not speak much in favor of the adoption of a narrow 
bodily view on his part.          
 
– 3 – 
 
 There is not a whole lot in the historically proximate testimony which gives us 
much indication of how it is Aristippus conceived of the nature of pleasure. It is true that 
in the Memorabilia Socrates mainly attributes certain kinds of crude bodily pleasures to 
Aristippus (esp. 2. 1. 1); as Gosling and Taylor point out, Xenophon, in that dialogue, 
seems to make him “the champion of the sybaritic life” (1982, 40).  
However, we should keep two important points in mind. One, as Diogenes 
reports, Xenophon was no friend of Aristippus (II 65),23 providing us with some reason 
to think he makes Socrates parody or exaggerate Aristippus’ outlook somewhat. And two, 
we should notice that it is Socrates who attributes certain kinds of pleasures to Aristippus 
while Aristippus himself never actually says anything about the sorts of pleasures which 
concern him. The only pertinent thing he says in this regard is that he wishes for a life of 
the greatest pleasure (2. 1. 9). There is admittedly little information in this, but we should 
keep in mind that he does use hedone here, and he does so without pointing to any 
pleasure-sources. And as we have seen, this term can encompass a wide variety of 
psychological experiences or states. Such inclusiveness is also hinted at in the fuller 
expression “a life of the greatest pleasure”, which, it might be noticed, nearly mirrors the 
 
and thereby a pleasure, and at 499e we are told we must perform good pleasures. Again, this 
seems to betray the largely open-ended understanding of pleasure at the time.        
23 Grote, 1865, III, 538: “Xenophon was a man of action, resolute in mind and vigorous in body, 
performing with credit the duties of the general as well as of the soldier. His heroes were men like 
Cyrus, Agesilaus, Ischomachus –warriors, horsemen, hunters, always engaged in active 
competition for power, glory or profit, and never shrinking from danger, fatigue, or privation. For 
a life of easy and unambitious indulgence…he had no respect. It was on this side that the 
character of Aristippus certainly seemed to be…the most defective.”  
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somewhat innocuous Protagoras passage discussed earlier (351b). Thus it is largely left 
open what exactly Aristippus has in mind here.  
There is however one peculiar term indirectly attributed to Aristippus in the 
Memorabilia perhaps worth mentioning. In Prodicus’ fable, Vice’s speech, whose words 
are meant to represent the views of Aristippus, contains the use of euphrainesthai of 
sexual love (2. 1. 24). The use of this term in conjunction with this particular object is 
somewhat unconventional;24 in this context we would have expected hedesthai, which, 
though it, as we have seen, carries a wide range of enjoyments, is more often paired with 
coarse physical pleasures. Euphrainesthai has some etymological connection with mind 
or intelligence, phronesis. Indeed, as previously noted, the same author (Prodicus) is 
made by Plato in the Protagoras to make explicit this very distinction. At 337c, Prodicus 
takes euphrainesthai and hedesthai to mark a dividing line between the enjoyment of 
mental activities and physical or bodily activities respectively (and Socrates tells us that 
many of those present agreed with this). Thus if we view Vice’s use of term in 
connection with what Prodicus is made to say at Prot. 337c, we may have reason to 
suspect that for Aristippus the enjoyment of a physical pleasure like sex is in part a 
mental one. This is speculation which outruns the Memorabilia text however, thus I leave 
it as it is.        
Outside of the historically proximate testimony, there are, I believe, three 
illuminative characterizations of pleasure attributed to Aristippus. The first two are to be 
found in the roman author Aelian and the Christian humanist Erasmus, and the other, in 
the physician and philosopher Galen. Aelian reports that “Aristippus seemed to speak 
with particular conviction when encouraging people neither to bother themselves in 
retrospect over that which has passed, nor to toil in prospect of things to come. For this 
kind of behavior is the mark of happiness and proof of a gracious frame of mind 
(eu)qumi/a).” (Var. Hist. 14. 6; 208 in Mannebach)25 Erasmus praises Aristippus with 
 
24 See Taylor, 1991, 138.  
25 Some commentators take this fragment to be beyond doubt preserving Aristippus’ own words 
(see Guthrie, 1975, 494).   
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possessing a kind of “joyful freedom”.26 And Galen attributes to Aristippus a conception 
of pleasure which he refers to as a kind of disposition of mind whereby one becomes 
indifferent to pain and hard to be enticed or beguiled (a)na/lghtoj kai\ dusgoh/teutoj).27   
The principal observation that springs to mind is the fact that all of these 
descriptions connote certain broad states of mind which are not restricted to bodily 
pleasures (though this is not to suggest that such pleasures or sensations are excluded or 
cannot be incorporated by such descriptions). Euthumia is perhaps akin to ‘gladness’ or 
‘joy’ and just translates as having one’s appetitive self (thumos) in a good state. This 
clearly captures something closer to a kind of general frame or disposition of mind than it 
does a particular pleasant episode or bodily sensation. Indeed, Democritus (who was 
apparently the first to employ this term in connection with one’s telos) is reported to have 
claimed that euthumia is not the same as hedone (DL 9. 45). Whatever we are to make of 
this, clearly there is some sort of distinction that is understood or permitted by these 
terms.  
Moreover, the fact that euthumia is paired in the Aelian passage with happiness is 
perhaps also suggestive. Eudaimonia has overtones of prosperity and external well-being 
while euthumia seems to imply more of an internal state and one which is not so 
dependent on external factors. But bodily pleasures, it might be thought, are usually tied 
more to external circumstances and contingencies than are states of gladness, joy or 
certain positive frames or dispositions of mind. Thus that Aristippus allegedly speaks of 
both eudaimonia and euthumia perhaps indicates that he is making room in his account 
not only for sensual or bodily pleasures but for mental, attitudinal, dispositional, etc, ones 
as well. Such inclusion seems to be further suggested by Erasmus’ ‘joyful freedom’ and 
by the controlled or self-possessed disposition mentioned by Galen –they each appear to 
 
26 “It does not seem to me misplaced, following the playful sanctity of Socrates and the joyful 
freedom of Aristippus, to move on to Diogenes of Sinope, who far surpasses all others with the 
inexhaustible charm of his words. In the end, though, with all their differing qualities, I have put 
these three on a par.” (Apophthegmata, in Opera Omnia, ed. J. Leclerc; see also Erasmus, 
Apophthegmes, 1969, 68. 62.)  
27 In Opera Omnia, ed. Kühn, Vol. 19, 230; see also Grote, 1865, 551, n. a.      
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express, and to allow for, states of mind broader in scope than particular episodes of 
pleasures or sensations.28  
Finally, there is one curious bit of repartee which perhaps deserves some 
discussion. Diogenes reports the following about Aristippus.  
Being asked how Socrates died, he answered, “As I would wish to die myself.” (II 
76) 
 If Aristippus has in mind something like Socrates’ manner of death as it is 
depicted in Plato’s Phaedo, this is a striking claim for a sybaritic hedonist to make. For 
surely it is difficult to make much sense of this under a bodily sensation view of 
hedonism. Forget talk of pleasurable sensations, to linger for weeks in a bare prison 
cell,29 with legs bonded to fetters, only to finally die of hemlock poisoning30 seems to be 
a case of nothing else but painful sensory experiences. What then might Aristippus 
mean?31  
A look at Socrates’ portrayal on that last day might provide us with a clue. Of 
utmost significance is just how joyful Socrates appears to be throughout (e.g. 58e) and 
the good cheer or contentment he shows in the face of his death (e.g. 117c4). It is clear 
that this joy has little to do with bodily pleasures; not only do the physical circumstances 
speak against it, as mentioned, but Socrates himself in his so-called ‘defense speech’ of 
the philosopher explicitly repudiates most physical pleasures (e.g. 64d2-7). Socrates’ joy, 
it might be suggested, seems to be connected to the strength with which he faces what 
 
28 Indeed, Grote, 1865, 551, is absolute in taking the account of pleasure attributed to Aristippus 
by Galen to be ‘a very different doctrine’ from the sensation model held by the younger 
Aristippus. 
29 A month, according to Xenophon (Mem. 4. 8. 2).  
30 Despite how Plato depicts Socrates’ final moments, the effects of ingesting hemlock must have 
been dreadful (see Gill, 1973).   
31 Perhaps one way to make sense of this is to see Aristippus as a hedonist who believes in an 
afterlife and in its posthumous rewards and punishments. He might thus justify suffering the pains 
and cutting his life short because of the greater sensory pleasures promised for him in the 
afterlife. This is a possibility but I see no suggestion of it in the testimony.       
 
17 




                                                
cannot be changed, it seems to be born of someone who realizes that his state of mind is 
entirely within his own power and is the sort of thing that no one can take away from 
him, whatever else they may take away.32 People can impose physical pain on Socrates, 
or deprive him of pleasurable sensations, but they cannot prevent him from adopting a 
certain pro-attitude to things or approaching things in a certain joyful way. If something 
like this is on the right track, greater sense might be made out of Aristippus’ alleged 
admiration and approbation of Socrates’ death. And if this is the case, it would seem to 
provide further indication that Aristippus adheres to a quite open and flexible account of 
pleasure.  
Thus we may, I believe, safely conclude something like the following. Sensations 
and bodily pleasures are surely accommodated by, or make up a part of, Aristippus’ 
conception of pleasure, but there is little reason to believe it is exhausted by them. It is 
best to see it as one involving a significantly wide field of positive psychological states.         
 
– 4 – 
 
 Much of the testimony on Aristippus points very distinctly to a concern for a kind 
of inner emancipation or independence of mind in the handling of pleasures. What we 
get, in effect, is a picture of someone who seems to break with the particular tradition 
mentioned at the outset – where pleasure was viewed as largely irrational and as 
something that usually undermines a life of reason, self-control and self-sufficiency – by 
emphasizing a kind of focus on the internal employment or management of pleasures, 
whatever kind they may be. Consider simply a few examples:    
“The one to master pleasure is not he who abstains but he who employs it without 
being carried away by it –just as being a master of a ship or of a horse is not 
abstaining from using them, but directing them where one wishes” (Stob. Ecl. 3. 
 
32 See Seneca, Letters 23. 4-5 for a description of ‘joy’ which might be seen in part to bear 
witness to Socrates’ frame of mind near his death.   
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17. 17, italics added; see also DL II 75). 
“Aristippus, while clothed in purple and anointed with perfumes, was not less 
temperate than Diogene; for just as if somebody had equipped his body with the 
ability to be untouched by fire, he would be of good cheer even if he entrusted his 
person to Etna, so too anybody who has equipped himself well for pleasure will 
neither, when engulfed in it, get hot nor burn nor melt.” (Maxim. Tyr. 1. 9, italics 
added)33   
 By paralleling the effects of pleasure with the effects of something as powerful 
and destructive as fire, the latter quote attests to the strongly cautionary and admonitory 
perception of pleasure at the time. We might see this as further serving to accentuate 
Aristippus’ tremendous quality of self-mastery; like someone walking straight into a 
burning fire and not suffering from the flames and heat, Aristippus appears to indulge in 
pleasures without being subjugated or harmed in any way by their effects.  
Aristippus’ suggestion seems to be that it is some sort of precondition for feeling 
pleasure in the more enriched sense that one is not ‘swept away’ by it. It is not the 
abolishment of control or self-possession, but rather, the accompaniment and exercise of 
it which makes for the experience of pleasure to be a wholehearted one. Indeed, one 
might make a case, perhaps a somewhat conjectural one, that Aristippus actually takes 
some sort of control or self-possession to constitute a very part of the experience of 
pleasure. In support of this, I primarily have in mind the descriptions of pleasure 
attributed to Aristippus by Aelian and Galen. Aelian, it will be recalled, imputes to 
Aristippus the term eu)qumi/a and Galen a conception of pleasure whereby one becomes 
indifferent to pain and hard to be enticed or beguiled (a)na/lghtoj kai\ dusgoh/teutoj). 
Euthumia, as mentioned, carries the basic sense of having one’s emotional and appetitive 
 
33 This claim of maximal flexibility and autonomy, moreover, looks to be extended to almost all 
situations: “He was capable of adapting himself to place, time and person, and of playing his part 
appropriately under whatever circumstances.” (DL II 66) 
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self in a good state.34 Democritus’ understanding of the term is that it is “that in 
accordance with which the soul goes along calmly and with good balance…” (DL 9. 45). 
Democritus’ adverbial description might be taken to suggest that pleasure is not separated 
from the way it is approached, engaged in or attended to. If Aristippus has something like 
this in mind it might signal that he takes a calm and controlled approach or engagement 
to constitute a very part of the experienced pleasure.    
Galen’s choice of terminology is also interesting, especially dusgoh/teutoj, which 
means something like ‘hard to seduce by enchantments’ (o( go/hj is a sorcerer or an 
enchanter). A look at Plato’s use of gohteu/w in the Phaedo is perhaps illustrative 
because it comes in a context of expressing a view about certain pleasures on the 
condition of the subject. The soul cannot attain to the pure realm of the intellect if it lives 
a life of bondage to the body “bewitched (gegohteume/nh) by physical desires and 
pleasures to the point at which nothing seems to exist for it but the physical…” (81b) The 
general idea here is that certain pleasures put a spell on the subject, or deceive or 
manipulate him. In contrast, Aristippus is said by Galen to be upholding a conception of 
pleasure which includes immunity from such effects. Again, the suggestion here might be 
that a sort of unbeguiledness, this frame of mind which renders the person who has it free 
from certain enslaving influences, turns out to play a constitutive part of the total 
pleasure-experience. The enjoyment of say certain bodily pleasures will be somewhat 
incomplete or impoverished without the element of a kind of internal control or self-
possession, an element which Aristippus might be taking as part and parcel of the overall 
appropriate enjoyment.  
If this overall reading of Aristippus is on the right track, it should be viewed as 
fairly ethically significant. According to Aristotle, well-being or happiness (eudaimonia) 
is complete in so far as it achieves everything we want and it is self-sufficient if it lacks 
nothing that we need to achieve all our desires (EN 1097b20-21). It is this concern for 
self-sufficiency that appears to be given particular emphasis here by Aristippus. Since 
 
34 See Gosling and Taylor, 1982, 30.  
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control and self-possession are in some way intimately connected to pleasure and its 
pursuit, it becomes more unlikely that Aristippus will have his desires thwarted, and so 
experience frustration because of it. It is this sort of autonomy which might give him 
good reason to think his happiness to be invulnerable –a crucial aim for all Greek 
ethicists.  
One final point. It is interesting that, apart from a few contentious anecdotes, 
nowhere do we meet with much hint of a breach with social morality on Aristippus’ part. 
Perhaps there is some sort of connection here with Aristippus’ appeal to self-control and 
self-sufficiency. After all, it is often those who lose control of themselves, in the sense of 
being unable to gain mastery over their own desires, who become susceptible to hubristic 
behavior. Indeed, Socrates (who, we remember, was closely associated with Aristippus) 
in Xenophon suggests something remarkably similar. What Xenophon continually 
stresses is Socrates’ mastery over the appetites that trouble ordinary people, and which 
typically motivate unethical conduct. In Xenophon, self-control (enkrateia) forms the 
basis or core of Socratic ethics; in the Memorabilia, Socrates says that enkrateia is the 
foundation of all virtue (1. 5. 4). Since our focus here is on the moral virtues, let us see 
how enkrateia, according to Socrates, connects up with justice and friendship. In 
Xenophon’s Apology, he says,  
“Who is there in your knowledge that is less a slave to his bodily appetites than I 
am? Who in the world more free, for I accept neither gifts nor pay from any one? 
Whom would you with reason regard as more just than the one so reconciled to 
his present possessions as to want nothing beside that belongs to another?” (16, 
italics added) 
According to Socrates, injustice seems to come about in the following sort of 
way. The individual who lacks enkrateia is constantly in need of money, because he is 
always looking for the means to satisfy his desires. The danger of injustice here is that he 
will seize and appropriate the goods of others to satisfy his avariciousness. On the other 
hand, the individual who practices enkrateia, he who has perfect control over his desires, 
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will have no need for money, and so no need to help himself to the goods of others. In a 
word, he who needs little and controls his appetites will not be prompted to commit 
unjust actions towards others, the enkratic individual will end up being “fair in his 
dealings” with others (Mem. 2. 6. 5). Now, certainly, there is no developed theory like 
this in Aristippus with respect to social morality or a concern for others. Nor, 
correspondingly, is there any indication in the above reading of Aristippus that he will 
never wind up in breach of the boundaries of morally expected behavior. However, if I 
am right about Aristippus, whatever the exact details, this is certainly a comprehensive 
and regulated approach to pleasure and to hedonism, one that does not, on the whole, run 
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